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I. INTRODUCTION 
Multidistrict litigation procedures have grown in significance as an 
important tool for resolving large-scale litigation.  Indeed, in recent years, 
various reports have noted that from one third to one half of all cases in 
the federal courts are part of MDL proceedings.1  From the defendants’ 
perspective, consolidation in a federal MDL proceeding may make 
nationwide litigation more manageable.  From a plaintiff’s perspective, 
consolidating the litigation in an MDL proceeding may increase the 
pressure on defendants to enter into a global settlement of the asserted 
claims.  Thus, both defendants and plaintiffs may have reasons to support 
creation of an MDL proceeding. 
Nonetheless, in recent years as their use has grown, MDL proceedings 
have been the subject of increasing criticism.  Defendants in certain MDL 
proceedings have felt pressured to settle claims of dubious merit.  
Moreover, as aggregate litigation of this sort increases, there is an 
incentive for plaintiffs’ counsel to include more and more claims that are 
not meritorious, in order to increase their own fees and influence in the 
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 1.   See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge 
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3) (“[C]urrently 
almost half of the civil cases pending in the federal courts are part of an MDL.”), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828461; Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest 
Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 
784 (2012) (“Recent empirical work by the Federal Judicial Center reveals that one third of all civil 
cases in the federal courts right now are part of a pending MDL.”); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, MDL PROCEEDINGS: ELIMINATING THE CHAFF, 1, 24 n.2 (2015) [hereinafter “U.S. 
CHAMBER”] (“More than one-third of the civil cases pending in the nation’s federal courts are now 
consolidated in multidistrict litigations . . . .”), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/ 
sites/1/MDL_Proceedings_web.pdf; DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., STANDARDS AND BEST 
PRACTICES FOR LARGE AND MASS-TORT MDLS xi (2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/ 
files/centers/judicialstudies/standards_and_best_practices_for_large_and_mass-tort_mdls.pdf 
(“MDLs represented 45.6% of the pending civil cases as of June 2014.”). 
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proceedings.2  With aggregation comes the risk that individual claims may 
receive less scrutiny, which may increase the risk that non-meritorious 
claims receive compensation. 
Such sentiments have led to proposals for reform of MDL practice.  
The proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, for 
example, includes proposed reforms to MDL procedures in addition to 
reforms designed to curb class action abuses.3  Among other things, the 
Act would require plaintiffs in MDL proceedings to provide evidence of 
their alleged injury within forty-five days of their case being transferred to 
a multidistrict proceeding.4  It would prohibit trials in multidistrict 
proceedings unless “all parties to that civil action consent.”5  And it would 
increase interlocutory appellate involvement in the MDL by providing 
appellate jurisdiction over orders that “may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of one or more civil actions in the proceedings.”6  
These provisions and others are designed to “diminish abuses in class 
action and mass tort litigation that are undermining the integrity of the U.S. 
legal system.”7 
However, despite the criticisms and calls for reform of the MDL 
process, courts and litigants have utilized the existing multidistrict 
procedures to effectively and efficiently resolve cases formerly spread 
among multiple jurisdictions, both state and federal.  These procedures 
have avoided duplicative effort, resulted in the more expeditious 
resolution of litigation, and in general increased judicial efficiency.  On 
balance, for litigation that meets the requisite criteria, MDL procedures 
have proven to be a beneficial tool to advance the efficient resolution of 
litigation that otherwise might defy easy resolution.  Indeed, the criteria 
for creating an MDL proceeding were created with this goal in mind: to 
identify those proceedings that might benefit in terms of increased 
                                                          
 2.   See, e.g., In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-MD-
2004, 2016 WL 4705827, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2016) (Mem.) (“[T]he Court had to waste judicial 
resources deciding motions in cases that should have been dismissed by plaintiff’s counsel earlier—
cases that probably should never have been brought in the first place.  Enough is enough.”); U.S. 
CHAMBER, supra note 1, at 1 (“MDL proceedings are morphing from a procedural device that is 
intended to create efficiencies in civil litigation (particularly pretrial discovery) into lawsuit magnets. 
. . . [B]ecause multidistrict proceedings by design have tended to prioritize global issues over 
individual ones, plaintiffs’ counsel have successfully warehoused meritless claims and shielded them 
from judicial scrutiny in a way they never could if all cases were being tried individually.”). 
 3.   Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 4.   Id. § 105 (section (i) to the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1407). 
 5.   Id. (section (j) to the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1407). 
 6.   Id. (section (k)(1) to the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1407). 
 7.   Id. § 102(2). 
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efficiency from the consolidation of pretrial proceedings in a single federal 
jurisdiction. 
This article addresses one particular aspect of MDL procedures — the 
use of MDL proceedings to resolve common issues of fact or law that may 
be dispositive for the entire litigation or certain categories of claims.  The 
article presents evidence demonstrating that this has been one of the most 
effective aspects of MDL litigation in terms of bringing litigation to a close 
and effectively and fairly resolving claims.  Where litigants have taken 
advantage of these procedures, a number of MDL proceedings have been 
significantly narrowed or entirely resolved through summary judgment or 
other proceedings on common issues central to the litigation.  The full 
implementation of such procedures can only further the MDL process as 
an effective means of resolving large-scale, complex litigation. 
Part II discusses general MDL procedures, including the standards 
governing MDL consolidation and the procedures that MDL courts have 
developed to manage and resolve complex litigation.  The statute 
establishing the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation imposes certain 
criteria that must be met in order to establish an MDL proceeding.  Those 
criteria explicitly include the existence of “common issues” among the 
cases that will be part of the MDL proceeding.  Thus, the statutory 
framework specifically contemplates that the MDL process may be 
utilized to efficiently address common issues, which may be dispositive of 
all or certain categories of claims. 
Part III discusses several examples in which MDL courts have 
significantly advanced the resolution of litigation by resolving such 
common issues that cut across the litigation or significant categories of 
claims.  In some instances, nationwide litigation has been completely 
resolved through such procedures.  In other instances, such procedures 
have served to better define the litigation and the categories of claims that 
are more or less viable, facilitating resolution through settlement or 
through further litigation of the remaining claims. 
Part IV discusses some ways in which these procedures might be 
further enhanced.  By coordinating the resolution of these common issues 
with state courts that may have satellite litigation outside of the MDL 
proceeding and rigorously applying the standards for evaluating scientific 
evidence where applicable, for example, additional benefits may be 
achieved.  In addition, the scheduling of motion practice and discovery 
may be phased in order to obtain additional efficiencies, potentially 
avoiding unnecessary expense and effort by the parties involved in the 
proceedings.  Finally, resolution of common issues may be coupled with 
individualized review of claims to weed out weak or frivolous claims and 
further narrow the litigation. 
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II. THE MDL FRAMEWORK 
In 1968, Congress passed the act establishing the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) to consider motions to consolidate 
federal cases filed in multiple jurisdictions for the limited purpose of 
coordinated pretrial proceedings before a single judge.8  The Panel is 
comprised of sitting federal judges who meet approximately once every 
two months to consider motions to establish MDL proceedings and to 
transfer newly-filed cases to existing MDL proceedings.9 
The statute lays out the criteria that must be satisfied in order for an 
MDL proceeding to be established.  Among other things, transfer of 
pending cases to a single district for pretrial proceedings is only 
appropriate when: (1) the actions “involv[e] one or more common 
questions of fact,” (2) the “transfer[] . . . will be for the convenience of 
parties and witnesses,” and (3) the transfer “will promote the just and 
efficient conduct of such actions.”10  The proponent of transfer generally 
bears the burden to demonstrate that these factors are met.11 
Panel decisions have provided further guidance regarding the types of 
cases that may be appropriate for pretrial consolidation.  For example, 
where there are only a minimal number of actions sought to be transferred, 
the burden on the proponent of transfer is heightened.12  Where there are 
only a couple related cases, MDL consolidation may not be appropriate 
because the potential inconvenience to the parties from consolidation may 
outweigh the efficiencies achieved through consolidation.  Cooperation 
among the courts presiding over these related cases may be preferable to 
consolidation. 
Similarly, where issues that are not common to the cases predominate, 
creation of an MDL proceeding may not be appropriate.13  In Electrolux, 
                                                          
 8.   Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109, 109–10 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012)). 
 9.   28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (d); Hon. John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and 
Improving the MDL Process, Summer 2012, at 26, 27. 
 10.   28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 11.   See In re Chase Inv. Servs. Corp. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) & Wage and Hour Litig., 
908 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (Mem.) (citing In re Transocean Ltd. Sec. Litig. (No. II), 
753 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (Mem.)). 
 12.   In re UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381 
(J.P.M.L. 2011) (Mem.) (“Where only a minimal number of actions are involved, the moving party 
generally bears a heavier burden of demonstrating the need for centralization.”); In re Scotch Whiskey, 
299 F. Supp. 543, 544 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (“[W]here, as here, there are a minimal number of cases 
involved in the litigation the moving party bears a strong burden to show that the common questions 
of fact are so complex and the accompanying common discovery so time-consuming as to overcome 
the inconvenience to the party whose action is being transferred and its witnesses.”). 
 13.   See, e.g., In re Electrolux Dryer Prods. Liab. Litig., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 
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for example, the Panel denied a motion seeking to consolidate thirty-three 
individual actions and two putative class actions for fire-related property 
damages caused by an alleged common defect in dryers.14  The Panel 
denied the motion after concluding that “[o]n the present record, it appears 
that individualized facts concerning the circumstances of each fire, 
including installation, repair, and maintenance, will predominate over the 
common factual issues alleged by plaintiffs.”15  Likewise, in In re Spray 
Polyurethane Foam Insulation, the Panel rejected a request to centralize 
eight actions for damages allegedly caused by various insulation products 
installed in plaintiffs’ properties, noting again that voluntary cooperation 
among the courts and parties would be preferable to consolidation given 
that “it appears that individualized facts concerning the chemical 
composition of the different products, the training and practices of each 
installer, and the circumstances of installation at each residence will 
predominate over the common factual issues alleged by plaintiffs.”16 
Relatedly, where there is little overlap in the defendants in the filed 
actions, consolidation may be rejected.  In In re Ambulatory Pain Pump-
Chondrolysis Products Liability Litigation, for example, the Panel denied 
a motion for MDL transfer where most, if not all, of the defendants were 
named in only “a handful” of the actions.17  Similarly, consolidation of 
cases involving defendants who are competitors may be a concern, given 
the potential for the disclosure of trade secrets or other potentially sensitive 
business information during discovery.18 
Frequently, however, the propriety of MDL consolidation will be 
                                                          
2013) (Mem.); In re Spray Polyurethane Foam Insulation Prods. Liab. Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 
1364 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (Mem.); see also In re Yellow Brass Plumbing Component Prods. Liab. Litig., 
844 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (Mem.) (denying centralization where “significant 
localized intervening causation issues [were] expected”); In re Ambulatory Pain-Pump Chondrolysis 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (citing both product differences and 
the plaintiffs’ “different medical histories” in denying centralization); In re Children’s Pers. Care 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1366 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (Mem.) (denying centralization where 
lawsuits involved “[m]ore than ten different baby products with differing formulations”); In re 
Victoria’s Secret Undergarments/Intimate Apparel Prods. Liab. Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1350 
(J.P.M.L. 2009) (Mem.) (denying centralization because the multiple products will cause discovery to 
“vary among the actions”). 
 14.   Electrolux, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. 
 15.   Id. at 1377. 
 16.   In re Spray Polyurethane Foam Insulation, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 1364. 
 17.   In re Ambulatory Pain Pump-Chondrolysis, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. 
 18.   See, e.g., In re Yellow Brass Plumbing, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1378 (“[W]e are typically hesitant 
to centralize litigation against multiple, competing defendants which marketed, manufactured and sold 
similar products.”); see also In re Invokana (Canagliflozin) Prods. Liab. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 
1348 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (“[A] multi-defendant MDL may prolong pretrial proceedings, because of, inter 
alia, the possible need for separate discovery and motion tracks, as well as the need for additional 
bellwether trials.”). 
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undisputed.  As noted above, both plaintiffs and defendants may have 
incentives to seek the creation of an MDL proceeding.  Moreover, the 
situations in which the statutory criteria are met may be relatively obvious.  
Rather, the parties instead may focus their debate upon the proper forum 
for the MDL proceedings, arguing for fora and specific judges whom they 
perceive as being more favorable to their position in the litigation.  Here, 
too, the Panel has developed various criteria for determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction, such as the convenience and accessibility of the 
forum, the location of the first-filed case, the location where a majority of 
actions are pending, the progress of the litigation in each forum, the 
number of cases in each forum, the parties’ preference regarding forum, 
the experience of the judges presiding over the cases in MDL proceedings, 
and the ability of the various courts to handle another MDL proceeding.19 
Nonetheless, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, critical to the 
establishment of an MDL proceeding is the existence of “common issues” 
among the cases, warranting consolidation.  The common issue 
requirement does not mean that the cases are appropriate for consolidation 
for all purposes (including trial) or that procedures such as class 
certification are warranted.  To the contrary, cases in most MDL 
proceedings are inappropriate for consolidation or for class certification, 
given the predominance of individualized issues among the various cases 
that have been filed20 and the immature nature of the litigation.21  
                                                          
 19.   Hon. John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2225, 2239–2240 (2008). 
 20.   Courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to consolidate entire product liability cases for trial 
on such grounds.  See, e.g., In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 446 (D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting 
consolidation in pharmaceutical litigation given diverse medical histories and claimed injuries because 
the “evidence [was] specific and unique to each Plaintiff’s case . . . [and] it [was therefore] clear that 
individual issues in these cases w[ould] predominate.”); Hasman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 106 F.R.D. 
459, 460 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (refusing to consolidate three product liability cases arising out of 
plaintiffs’ use of intrauterine contraceptive device because individual issues predominated because 
“[c]onsolidation would make trial confusing, unmanageable and perhaps inequitable”); Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1098 (Miss. 2004) (reversing trial court order in 
Propulsid pharmaceutical litigation, citing different fact situations, medical histories, sets of witnesses 
and testimony, “all in addition to addressing the myriad causation and other products liability issues . 
. . [that] would unavoidably confuse the jury and irretrievably prejudice the defendants”); Id. at 1101 
(“No jury can be expected to reach a fair result under these circumstances, especially concerning an 
immature tort in which the few cases actually tried suggest that medical evidence about individual 
causation will be an essential aspect of the case.”); see also In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 
F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993) (granting mandamus and vacating order consolidating repetitive stress 
injury claims given that individual issues outweighed “sole common fact . . . [of] a claim of injury of 
such generality that it covers a number of different ailments for each of which there are numerous 
possible causes other than the tortious conduct of one of the defendants”); Graziose v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 202 F.R.D. 638, 641 (D. Nev. 2001) (noting that trial consolidations are particularly 
problematic “in an area of scientific inquiry such as medicine, where . . . scientific and legal 
controversies are impacted by many individualized circumstances and conditions”). 
 21.   For example, consolidation of entire cases for trial is typically inappropriate in cases 
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Nonetheless, this requirement does provide a basis for gaining efficiencies 
through litigation of certain issues that are common among all or certain 
categories of claims. 
Thus, the statutory framework expressly contemplates that one of the 
benefits of the MDL process is resolution on a consolidated pretrial basis 
of issues that are common among all or certain categories of the cases that 
are centralized in the coordinated proceedings.22  The resolution of such 
common issues extends not merely to discovery or other procedural 
matters, but common substantive issues among the cases.  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, 
Congress anticipated that, during the pendency of pretrial proceedings, 
final decisions might be rendered in one or more of the actions 
consolidated pursuant to § 1407.  It specified that “at or before the 
conclusion of . . . pretrial proceedings,” each of the transferred actions 
must be remanded to the original district “unless [the action] shall have 
been previously terminated.”23 
Indeed, one of the primary efficiencies that the authors of the MDL process 
sought to gain was the resolution on a common basis of certain dispositive 
issues that would either narrow or eliminate entirely the aggregate mass of 
asserted claims.24 
In recent years, the Panel has underscored the importance of this 
function of the MDL process.  In response to concerns that the creation of 
                                                          
involving mass torts that are not mature.  As the Manual for Complex Litigation observes, “[i]n less 
mature mass tort cases, aggregation decisions may be more difficult and may require the judge to 
obtain additional information. . . .  If there are few prior verdicts, judgments, or settlements, additional 
information may be needed to determine whether aggregation is appropriate.”  MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.314 (2004).  The Manual defines a mature mass tort as “one 
that rests on clearly established law and tested and accepted evidence.”  Id.  The Manual explains that: 
Litigation is generally considered mature if through previous cases (1) discovery has been 
thorough, producing a consensus that the available important information has been 
provided, (2) a number of verdicts have been received indicating the value of claims, and 
(3) plaintiffs’ contentions have been shown to have merit.  In a typical mature mass tort, 
little or no new evidence is likely, appellate review of novel legal issues has been 
completed, and a full cycle of trial strategies has been explored. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  Such criteria generally will not be satisfied in an MDL proceeding. 
 22.   See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 23.   Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 904–05 (2015) (alteration in original) 
(quoting § 1407). 
 24.   As the Supreme Court has observed, the drafters of Section 1407 hoped to realize a number 
of efficiencies, including to “eliminate duplication in discovery, avoid conflicting rulings and 
schedules, reduce litigation cost, and save the time and effort of the parties, the attorneys, the 
witnesses, and the courts.”  Id. at 903 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 21, § 
20.131).  See also DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., supra note 1, at 7 (recommending that “[t]he 
transferee judge should give priority to deciding issues broadly applicable to multiple claimants in the 
MDL”). 
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an MDL proceeding may lead to the filing of less meritorious claims as 
cases are aggregated, the Panel itself has noted that one of the missions of 
an MDL judge is to aggressively weed out such “spurious claims.”  Thus, 
in In re Seroquel Products Liability Litigation, the Panel noted that “[t]he 
response to such concerns more properly inheres in assigning all related 
actions to one judge committed to disposing of spurious claims quickly.”25  
As the Panel explained in another transfer order: 
[T]he transferee court handling several cases in an MDL likely is in a 
better position—and certainly is in no worse position than courts in 
multiple districts handling individual cases—to properly address 
meritless claims.  There are many tools a transferee court may use to 
accomplish this task.  And importantly, if defendants believe plaintiffs’ 
counsel are filing frivolous claims, it is incumbent upon defense counsel 
to bring that concern to the attention of the transferee court, and to 
propose a process to identify and resolve such claims.26 
In other words, the Panel has expressed the view that centralization 
through MDL consolidation may actually function better in weeding out 
weak and frivolous claims than allowing cases to proceed in a more 
dispersed fashion in multiple different fora.  Moreover, the Panel has 
encouraged courts and defendants to adopt procedures to accomplish such 
ends to ensure that only meritorious claims remain and centralization does 
not lead to a proliferation of claims of dubious merit. 
There are a number of different types of issues that may arise in the 
sort of large complex litigations that are typically consolidated in MDL 
proceedings.  The Manual for Complex Litigation counsels that 
“[i]dentifying [such] issues—and the governing statutory or decisional 
law—is critical to developing a plan for efficiently resolving complex tort 
litigation.”27  Accordingly, “[i]n early Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 
conferences and status conferences, the judge and counsel should work to 
narrow the issues, claims, and defenses.”28  Among the issues the Manual 
for Complex Litigation gives as examples of “[i]ssues to be taken up early 
in the litigation” are “whether the facts and expert evidence support a 
finding that the products or acts in question have the capacity to cause the 
type of injuries alleged” and “whether one or more classes should be 
certified.”29 
                                                          
 25.   In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2006). 
 26.   In re Cook Med., Inc., IVC Filters Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., 53 F. Supp. 
3d 1379, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (Mem.). 
 27.   MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 21, § 22.634. 
 28.   Id. at 411. 
 29.   Id. 
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In a product liability action, for example, causation is a critical 
threshold issue with respect to each claim.  Absent credible proof of 
causation, plaintiffs have no claim against defendants.30  Moreover, the 
evidence supporting such claims must be reliable under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.31  In order to obtain a jury verdict in their favor, plaintiffs 
must have admissible expert testimony demonstrating causation.32  
Accordingly, as discussed more fully below, substantive rulings regarding 
causation as well as rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence relating 
to causation under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals33 have often been dispositive in large MDL 
proceedings involving product liability claims. 
Similarly, product identification is often an important threshold 
issue.34  Plaintiffs must demonstrate that it was the defendant’s product, 
and not some other manufacturer’s, that caused their alleged injury.  
                                                          
 30.   See, e.g., Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 2000); Soldo v. 
Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 524 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“Proof of causation is a necessary 
element in a products liability action.  Absent a causal relationship between the defendant’s product 
and the plaintiff’s injury the defendant cannot be held liable on a theory of negligence, strict product 
liability, or misrepresentation.”); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (“First, a plaintiff must show that the substance to which she was exposed can cause the 
type of injury alleged.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 28(a), § 28 cmt. 
(c)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 31.   See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); 
see also generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 21, §§ 23.1–23.37. 
 32.  See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (evidence in prescription drug case must be admissible 
expert testimony that is both relevant and reliable); Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 
F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]o establish causation, [plaintiffs] must offer admissible expert 
testimony regarding both general causation, i.e., that xylene exposure can cause the type of ailments 
from which [plaintiffs claim] to suffer; and specific causation, i.e., that xylene exposure actually 
caused [their] alleged neurological problems.”); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 580 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“Without admissible expert testimony on causation and product defect, no reasonable jury could find 
for [plaintiff] . . . .”); Sandoz Pharms., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (observing that in prescription drug case 
“involving complex issues of causation not readily apparent to the finder of fact, plaintiff must present 
admissible expert testimony to carry her burden”); Bouchard v. American Home Prods. Corp., 213 F. 
Supp. 2d 802, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“A jury should not be allowed to speculate as to causation, and 
to eliminate that speculation an expert witness may be necessary.”). 
 33.   See generally 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 34.   See, e.g., Garcia v. Pfizer, Inc., 268 F. App’x 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t was not 
sufficient for Garcia to introduce evidence that the Defendants distributed OPV in Texas in 1970.  
Instead, she must have adduced evidence that Defendants supplied the specific doses that allegedly 
caused her injury.”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (dismissing 
failure to warn claims because “Plaintiffs . . . produced no evidence from which a trier of fact could 
infer that the dose in question originated in a lot of vaccine associated with a disproportionate number 
of adverse health effects”); Hanks by Old Nat’l Trust Co. v. Korea Iron & Steel Co., 993 F. Supp. 
1204, 1212 (S.D. Ill. 1998) (granting summary judgment when plaintiff  “can show, at best, only that 
Kiswire [source of wire rope] was a ‘possible’ but not a ‘probable’ manufacturer of the wire rope that 
failed” because the wire rope could have come from “numerous other sources”); In re Dow Corning 
Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 353–54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (“It is well established that product 
identification is an essential element of every products liability action, regardless of which state’s law 
governs.”). 
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Product identification is therefore a critical piece in the causal chain 
establishing liability. 
Whether plaintiffs’ claims are barred because adequate warnings 
accompanied the defendant’s product is another potential threshold 
issue.35  Plaintiffs cannot pursue claims based on the alleged hazards of a 
product where the court determines that the warnings accompanying the 
product were adequate or that plaintiffs in fact had sufficient information 
to put them on notice of the alleged hazards. 
The statute of limitations can also be an important threshold issue that 
will resolve the litigation or narrow it to claims based on certain time 
periods.  Where plaintiffs were on notice of their claims due to publicity 
regarding the alleged injuries outside the statutory limitations period, their 
claims are barred as a matter of law and they cannot pursue them.36  
Accordingly, rulings on statute of limitations can be used to significantly 
narrow the litigation or eliminate it entirely. 
Finally, as discussed more fully below, in recent years, defendants 
have increasingly raised federal preemption as a bar to product liability 
claims in MDL proceedings.  State law product liability claims that are 
contrary to federal law are barred under the Supremacy Clause, and courts 
have applied this principle to dismiss pharmaceutical claims asserting that 
warnings were inadequate where there is evidence that the FDA would not 
have approved stronger warnings.37  Likewise, generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers have repeatedly invoked the doctrine to bar claims that they 
should have included additional or different warnings to their labeling on 
the ground that they are not permitted under federal law to adopt warnings 
that are different than those used with the matching branded 
pharmaceutical product.38 
                                                          
 35.   See, e.g., In re Meridia, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 811; In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806–09 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (cataloguing cases in forty-eight jurisdictions 
adopting learned intermediary doctrine). 
 36.   See, e.g., Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 722–23 (6th Cir. 2004) (claims alleging 
exposure to radiation emitted by nuclear weapons plant were time barred as a result of widespread 
publicity); Blanton v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799, 802–03 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (claims 
alleging environmental contamination from National Electric Coil plant were time barred due to 
“widespread reports by local, regional and national media”); In re Burbank Environ. Litig., 42 F. Supp. 
2d 976, 981 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (plaintiffs on notice of claims where “[a] plethora of newspaper articles 
and multiple newscasts prior to 1993 reported Lockheed’s involvement in contamination of the 
Burbank area”); Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109, 1111, 1115–16 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (“extensive, widespread publicity” barred claims by property owners alleging property damage 
from disposal of radioactive material: “The discovery rule does not allow a plaintiff to wait until the 
defendant admits it has caused plaintiff’s damage.  That would be a very long wait indeed.  The rule 
places the burden on plaintiffs to inquire as to the existence of a cause of action.”). 
 37.   See, e.g., In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 
155 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 38.   See id. 
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The standard way in which such issues are resolved is at the outset of 
the litigation through omnibus motions to dismiss or for summary 
judgment on all, or specific categories of, claims.39  Summary judgment 
motions may be coupled with motions to exclude particular evidence, such 
as motions to exclude expert evidence as unreliable under Rule 702 and 
Daubert.  Nonetheless, issues that may be dispositive of larger categories 
of claims are sometimes also raised through case-specific motions.  Once 
a litigant obtains a ruling in one of the cases pending before the MDL 
court, it may be merely an administrative matter to apply that ruling to 
other similar cases that are pending before the same court. 
In addition to formal motion practice, active case management also 
may be utilized to narrow the issues in an MDL proceeding.  Rule 16 
encourages the Court to exercise its case management authority to 
“formulat[e] and simplify[] the issues, and eliminat[e] frivolous claims or 
defenses.”40  This includes “limiting the use of testimony under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702,”41 and “controlling and scheduling discovery, 
including orders affecting disclosures and discovery under Rule 26 and 
Rules 29 through 37.”42  The various provisions in the Rule were designed 
to “encourage[] the court to become involved in case management early in 
the litigation” and “to stimulate litigants to narrow the areas of inquiry and 
advocacy to those they believe are truly relevant and material.”43  The 
drafters hoped to “promot[e] efficiency and conserv[e] judicial resources 
by identifying the real issues prior to trial, thereby saving time and expense 
for everyone.”44  Indeed, the Rule contemplates that such narrowing of the 
issues need not “await a formal motion for summary judgment” and may 
be accomplished by stipulation.45  Accordingly, standard proceedings 
under the Federal Rules may be utilized in an MDL proceeding to obtain 
rulings on common issues that may significantly narrow, or resolve 
entirely, large categories of claims. 
                                                          
 39.   The Federal Judicial Center’s guide for MDL proceedings specifies a “summary judgment 
motions deadline” as one of the key deadlines typically contained in an MDL case management order.  
BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUD. CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR TRANSFEREE JUDGES 17 (2011) 
[hereinafter ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, POCKET GUIDE], https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
2012/MDLGdePL.pdf. 
 40.   FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A). 
 41.   FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(D). 
 42.   FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F). 
 43.   FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
 44.   FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
 45.   Id.; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting that among the federal judiciary there is “an increased use of Rule 16’s pretrial conference 
authority to narrow the scientific issues in dispute”). 
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This may take the form of omnibus motions that relate to all claims in 
the MDL proceeding or to certain categories of claims.  It may take the 
form of individual motions for summary judgment that are relevant to an 
individual case, or which may tee up critical issues that have broader 
applicability.  In the latter situation, once an issue has been litigated in one 
case, it may be a fairly straightforward matter to apply that ruling in 
subsequent cases. 
In addition to these formal proceedings, the scope of litigation may be 
narrowed in less formal ways.  For example, as discovery proceeds and 
defendants collect information on individual claims, a process may be 
initiated by which defendants approach plaintiffs’ counsel and identify 
those cases that they believe are fundamentally flawed and should be 
voluntarily dismissed without involving the court through formal motion 
practice.  It may be that defendants discover that there are problems with 
product identification, issues regarding individual medical causation 
evidenced by the plaintiff’s medical records, or other reasons 
demonstrating that the claims are not viable.  MDL courts routinely order 
the disclosure of information in plaintiff fact sheets along with production 
of key documents (for example, production of medical records in cases 
involving allegations of personal injury).46  Defendants can ascertain from 
these materials and more formal discovery whether there are problems 
with particular individual cases that have been filed and raise them with 
plaintiffs’ counsel.  If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, such 
issues may then be raised with the court in individual cases on a rolling 
basis.  In this manner, the scope of the claims truly at issue can be 
narrowed without undue expenditure. 
Some courts have found it useful to employ additional procedures to 
accomplish similar results in slightly more formal ways.  For example, 
courts have issued Lone Pine47 orders requiring each plaintiff to provide 
basic information along with an affidavit from a medical expert to support 
the plaintiff’s claim.48  Depending on the circumstances, such more formal 
                                                          
 46.   See DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., supra note 1, at 14–15 (“One of the most useful and 
efficient initial mechanisms for obtaining individual plaintiff discovery is the use of fact sheets. . . . 
Similarly, requiring the collection of plaintiffs’ medical records (in personal injury cases) or 
employment histories (in employment cases) is another straightforward way that MDL courts can 
encourage a robust exchange of key information at a relatively early stage.”); U.S. CHAMBER, supra 
note 1, at 17. 
 47.   Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L 33606-85, 1986 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1626 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986). 
 48.   U.S. CHAMBER, supra note 1, at 17–19; see also, e.g., In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:11-cv-05468, 2016 WL 3281032, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2016); In re 
Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06 MD 1789(JFK), 2012 WL 5877418, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 
2012) (Lone Pine order being used with “increasing frequency” in MDLs to “streamline the docket”); 
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procedures may be appropriate to weed out claims that on their face are 
simply not viable, allowing the court to focus on the claims that are truly 
at issue in the litigation. 
This parallel track that gives scrutiny to individualized cases can be 
critical because some issues that are dispositive of cases will inherently be 
more individualized.  Thus, while common issues may dispose of all, or 
large categories of claims, there may be additional claims that can be 
quickly and efficiently resolved through such individualized scrutiny in 
the MDL proceedings.  Moreover, such scrutiny will ameliorate some of 
the concerns that critics of MDL proceedings have expressed—i.e., that 
aggregating claims in an MDL proceeding allows plaintiffs’ counsel to 
shield frivolous claims from scrutiny by lumping them in with other claims 
and avoiding individualized treatment.49  As one MDL judge has observed, 
“[r]egardless of the amount of judicial effort and resources, unless the 
court establishes a toll gate at which entrance to the litigation is controlled, 
non-meritorious cases will clog the process.”50  Indeed, some 
commentators have gone so far as to argue that because of such concerns, 
the “MDL, as currently structured, must be deemed unconstitutional, 
because it infringes on individual claimants’ procedural due process 
rights.”51  This separate, more individualized review, should mitigate such 
concerns.52 
                                                          
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 557 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744–45 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Rezulin Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 2843(LAK), 2005 WL 1105067, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2005); DUKE L. 
CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., supra note 1, at 15–16. 
 49.   As the Mentor court observed: 
[T]he evolution of the MDL process toward providing an alternative dispute resolution 
forum for global settlements has produced incentives for the filing of cases that otherwise 
would not be filed if they had to stand on their own merit as a stand-alone action.  Some 
lawyers seem to think that their cases will be swept into the MDL where a global settlement 
will be reached, allowing them to obtain a recovery without the individual merit of their 
cases being scrutinized as closely as it would if it proceeded as a separate individual action. 
In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-MD 2004 (CDL), 2016 
WL 4705827, at *1–2 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2016) (Mem.). 
 50.   Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict Litigation 
(MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L.J. 97, 186 (2013).  As Judge Robreno 
further observed, one mechanism for achieving this goal is to require early fact disclosure by plaintiffs 
accompanied by dismissal for noncompliance: “[C]ourts must establish procedures by which, at an 
early point, each plaintiff is required to provide facts which support the claim through expert 
diagnostics reports or risk dismissal of the case.”  Id. at 187. 
 51.   Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due 
Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 151 (2015).  See also 
Robreno, supra note 50, at 187 (“Aside from the significant due process issues raised by forcing parties 
to litigate or settle cases in groups, aggregation promotes the filing of cases of uncertain merit.  The 
incentive becomes the number of cases that can be filed, not the relative merit of the individual case.”). 
 52.   Early production of information and scrutiny of individualized claims may also facilitate 
settlement discussions.  One group of experts has observed that “settlement talks are often delayed 
precisely because the parties have not anticipated the need for assembling information necessary to 
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III. RESOLUTION OF COMMON ISSUES 
The framework established by federal statute and case law developed 
over the last several decades has been applied effectively to resolve large-
scale, dispersed litigation involving common questions of fact and law.  
The resolution of such common issues has arisen in a variety of kinds of 
cases, including pharmaceutical, medical device and other product liability 
actions, antitrust, employment, and other cases subject to consolidation in 
MDL proceedings.53 
A. Causation Issues 
As noted above, one of the primary common issues that has been 
litigated in product liability cases such as those involving pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices is the issue of causation.54  Numerous courts have 
utilized rulings on omnibus motions for summary judgment along with 
corresponding Daubert proceedings in order to narrow or even resolve 
entirely complex multidistrict litigation.  The Federal Judicial Center has 
encouraged MDL judges that they “should encourage the resolution of 
scientific disputes” regarding causation and other matters: “Judges must 
grapple with scientific issues in their roles as gatekeepers.”55 
1. The PPA MDL 
In the phenylpropanolamine (PPA) litigation, for example, resolution 
of Daubert motions played a significant role in determining which claims 
should receive compensation.56  After discovery and hearings regarding 
                                                          
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the global litigation and examine the potential value of 
individual claims.”  DUKE L. CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., supra note 1, at 14. 
 53.   See, e.g., Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006); In re 
Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. 
Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 54.   See ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, POCKET GUIDE, supra note 39, at 35 (“Because expert opinions 
play a vital role in many products liability MDLs, both during the discovery process and at trial, you 
should establish at any early pretrial conference a schedule for disclosing expert opinions in written 
reports, for deposing the experts, and for resolving Daubert motions.”). 
 55.   Id. at 36. 
 56.   See generally Hon. Barbara J. Rothstein et al., A Model Mass Tort: The PPA Experience, 54 
DRAKE L. REV. 621 (2006).  As the trial judge presiding over the PPA litigation later wrote: 
The In re PPA court’s decision to take an aggressive role in determining the admissibility 
of scientific evidence had the important practical result of setting clear parameters for 
motions for summary judgment.  Where the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony is ruled 
inadmissible, the plaintiffs’ cases are usually subject to dismissal.  Once the Daubert issues 
were decided, the court could rule on motions for summary judgment.  Such motions are a 
major vehicle for reducing meritless claims in a large litigation. 
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the scientific evidence of causation, the district court presiding over the 
MDL proceedings issued a ruling that granted in part defendants’ Daubert 
motion.57  The court excluded evidence regarding a causative link between 
PPA and hemorrhagic or ischemic stroke where plaintiffs had not taken 
the medication within seventy-two hours of their stroke and further 
excluded expert evidence regarding any causal link between PPA and all 
other alleged injuries such as seizures, cardiac injuries, and psychoses.58  
Not only did the district court’s ruling have a significant effect on the 
federal litigation because it was often outcome-determinative with respect 
to subsequent motions for summary judgment, but it also influenced state 
court litigation, particularly given that the federal court had invited state 
court judges presiding over similar litigation to attend the Daubert 
hearings.59 
As Judge Rothstein, the trial judge presiding over the PPA litigation 
and the subsequent Director of the Federal Judicial Center, later wrote: 
“The approach employed in In re PPA has become accepted as a model 
case management technique for incorporating the trends toward global 
resolution of scientific issues while respecting the limitations placed on 
the transferee judge by the Lexecon decision.”60  The court’s Daubert 
rulings “had the important practical result of setting clear parameters for 
motions for summary judgment,” which Judge Rothstein observed are “a 
major vehicle for reducing meritless claims in a large litigation.”61 
2. The Heparin MDL 
The Heparin MDL litigation provides another example in which MDL 
consolidation of cases followed by motion practice on generic issues 
proved successful in ultimately resolving the litigation.  Heparin is an 
anticoagulant used in dialysis procedures as well as various cardiac 
procedures such as cardiac bypass surgery.62  The Heparin litigation 
stemmed from a widely-publicized instance of contamination of heparin 
manufactured in China, which resulted in hundreds of complaints of 
adverse events and a significant investigation by both the FDA and CDC.63  
                                                          
Id. at 638. 
 57.   In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (W.D. Wash. 
2003). 
 58.   Id. at 1240–43. 
 59.   Rothstein et al., supra note 56, at 632–34. 
 60.   Id. at 638. 
 61.   Id. 
 62.   In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig., 803 F. Supp. 2d 712, 720 (N.D. Ohio 2011). 
 63.   Id. at 721–23. 
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As in other pharmaceutical litigation, the heparin claims arose within a 
patient population that suffered from serious pre-existing medical 
conditions.64 
Adverse events of the sort alleged in the heparin litigation were quite 
common in the population receiving heparin therapy.  For example, 
patients with end stage renal disease, who would be receiving heparin 
through dialysis treatment suffered a significant background mortality 
rate.65  Further, studies had shown that “cardiac disease is the major cause 
of death in dialysis patients, accounting for approximately 45% of all-
cause mortality.”66  As the CDC observed in its study of the adverse 
reactions, such reactions were not uncommon, and “[s]imilar adverse 
reactions” had arisen due to a variety of different causes: 
Similar adverse reactions have been documented among patients 
undergoing dialysis and have, in the past, been attributed to many causes, 
including dialyzer membranes, water impurities, residual disinfectants, 
and medications such as ACE inhibitors.  A systemic inflammatory 
response has also been described in the setting of cardiopulmonary 
bypass and has been attributed to activation of the contact system 
resulting from interactions of blood with the artificial surfaces of the 
bypass circuit and other mechanisms that activate the kinin-kallikrein 
pathway, complement system, and other systems.67 
The situation with patients receiving heparin in cardiac artery bypass 
procedures was similar, with patients experiencing such adverse 
cardiovascular events due to multiple potential causes having nothing to 
do with contamination.68 
Accordingly, regulatory authorities noted at the time that the sorts of 
events reported in patients receiving contaminated heparin occurred 
commonly in the absence of any contamination.  The FDA noted, for 
                                                          
 64.   Id. at 720 (“Many patients who receive heparin have serious pre-existing medical conditions.  
Patients with end-stage renal disease and patients undergoing coronary artery bypass surgery make up 
a significant number of those receiving vial heparin.”). 
 65.   See David B. Blossom et al., Outbreak of Adverse Reactions Associated with Contaminated 
Heparin, 359 N. ENG. J. MED. 2674, 2682 (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1056/NEJMoa0806450. 
 66.   Charles A. Herzog, Cardiac Arrest in Dialysis Patients: Approaches to Alter an Abysmal 
Outcome, 63 KIDNEY INT’L S84, S197 (2003), http://www.kidneyinternational-online.com/article/ 
S0085-2538(15)49250-6/pdf. 
 67.   Blossom et al., supra note 65, at 2682 (“describ[ing] a CDC epidemiologic investigation . . . 
[and] provid[ing] a clinical description of the reactions that occurred after the administration of 
heparin”). 
 68.   Norman J. Snow et al., Cardiothoracic Surgery: Diseases of the Heart, Great Vessels, and 
Thoracic Cavity, in ESSENTIALS OF SURGICAL SPECIALTIES 261 (P. Lawrence et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2000) 
(“Essentially all organ systems can be affected by complications of CABG and the physiologic 
disruptions associated with the heart lung machine.”). 
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example, that “[j]ust because there’s a report in a patient that took Heparin 
doesn’t necessarily mean that Heparin caused the event. . . .  [T]here are 
all kinds of events that occur.  A lot of these patients are very, very sick.”69  
The heparin litigation thus mimicked other pharmaceutical litigations in 
which plaintiffs’ counsel have sought out incidents of alleged injury 
occurring in a population with a significant background rate in an attempt 
to attribute some portion of that background rate to exposure to a 
pharmaceutical product. 
After reviewing the parties’ briefing and receiving expert testimony 
presented at a Daubert hearing, the court entered an order that had the 
effect of significantly narrowing the litigation.  The court ruled that several 
large categories of claims lacked reliable scientific support.70  The court’s 
ruling was firmly rooted in the scientific evidence regarding causation.  
The CDC had performed a study examining events that occurred after 
receiving contaminated heparin using a case definition for anaphylactoid 
events that occurred within sixty minutes of administration.71  As the court 
observed, there was no epidemiological evidence supporting adverse 
events that occurred outside this case definition.72  Instead, plaintiffs relied 
upon a variety of theoretical constructions based on animal and in vitro 
studies and hypothesized mechanisms of action.73  The court concluded 
that there was simply too great a gap in the available data and the expert’s 
opinions.74 
The court also concluded that there was no reliable evidence that 
contaminated heparin given in certain particular routes of administration 
could cause adverse health effects.75  Specifically, the court determined 
that there was no reliable evidence that contaminated heparin absorbed 
                                                          
 69.   Transcript of Press Conference, FDA (Feb. 28, 2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/UCM169342.pdf [https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/ 
20170406155231/]; See also Information on Adverse Event Reports and Heparin, FDA., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/u
cm112597.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2017) (“The fact that allergic symptoms or hypotension was 
reported does not mean that these were the cause of death in all cases. . . .  Reports have to be analyzed 
to see if there is a plausible causal association between the drug and the medical event. . . .  Many 
patients have other serious conditions that could have caused the reported problem.”); Transcript of 
Press Conference, FDA (April 21, 2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
MediaTranscripts/UCM169333.pdf [https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170406155133/] (“[A]s 
we have repeatedly pointed out, just because somebody got heparin and they had a reaction, it doesn’t 
imply a causal relationship and there’s always been some background incidents in these reactions 
reported.”). 
 70.   In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig, 803 F. Supp. 2d 712, 753–54 (N.D. Ohio 2011). 
 71.   Id. at 721. 
 72.   Id. at 739, 753. 
 73.   See id. at 739 (concluding that such expert opinion was merely “speculative”). 
 74.   Id. at 753 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). 
 75.   Id. at 753–54. 
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through subcutaneous administration, as opposed to intravenous 
administration, could cause adverse health effects.76  In support of her 
opinions on this issue, plaintiffs’ expert cited an abstract she had co-
authored describing a study in rats, which showed that contamination was 
absorbed after subcutaneous administration.  However, as the court noted, 
the study did not support the expert’s conclusions: 
[The expert] does not explain, nor does the abstract elucidate how human 
effects could be extrapolated from these results in rats.  Nor does she 
explain how she arrived at her opinion that the study confirms that 
subcutaneous administration of contaminated heparin can cause harm in 
patients (a conclusion not part of the published abstract).77 
Accordingly, the court again concluded that there was “too great an 
analytical gap” between the expert’s opinions and the data on which they 
were based.78 
Finally, the court excluded expert opinions asserting that 
contaminated heparin could “cause a sepsis-like response or aggravate 
sepsis or disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC).”79  The court 
noted that “[t]here has been no study that has looked at OSCS 
contaminated heparin and its effects in septic patients.”80  While plaintiffs’ 
expert had cited literature on “feedback loops” and the claim that OSCS 
activated the complement system, the court concluded that the expert 
“presents nothing that would link the feedback loop responses she 
theorizes based on the literature to patients exposed to contaminated 
heparin.”81  The court therefore concluded that “there is ‘simply too great 
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.’”82 
Based on these Daubert rulings, the court granted summary judgment 
on these categories of claims, which represented more than fifty percent 
of the claims asserted in the litigation.  Accordingly, like the PPA 
litigation, the court’s rulings on these common issues significantly 
advanced the resolution of the overall litigation by disposing of large 
categories of asserted claims. 
                                                          
 76.   Id. at 739–40. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Id. at 753. 
 79.   Id. at 738. 
 80.   Id. 
 81.   Id. (“[The expert] has done no experiments demonstrating the ability of OSCS or OSCS 
contaminated heparin to cause such feedback loops, nor can she point to studies published by others.”). 
 82.   Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).  The court also ruled that 
claims alleging “clotting effects” apart from HIT were inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, 
noting that plaintiffs had failed to make “any showing that any such opinion offered . . . is based on 
reliable methodology.”  Id. at 736. 
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3. The Lipitor MDL 
The Lipitor MDL addressed claims that a statin medication used to 
treat high cholesterol increased patients’ risk of developing Type 2 
diabetes.  As with many pharmaceutical claims, there was a significant 
background rate of diabetes in the population that was prescribed this 
cholesterol-reducing medication.  The court considered dispositive 
omnibus motions for summary judgment and to exclude plaintiffs’ expert 
evidence under Rule 702 and Daubert, issuing rulings that were largely 
dispositive of the litigation. 
The studies that had examined the question of whether Lipitor was 
associated with an increased risk of Type 2 diabetes examined the effects 
at various dosages, ranging from 10 mg to 80 mg.83  While the studies 
generally found no association with the lower dosages, there was a 
statistically significant increased risk observed in the 80 mg dosage.84 
In considering this scientific evidence, the court excluded expert 
testimony regarding general causation at doses below 80 mg.85  The court 
reasoned that, because epidemiological studies on the lower doses had 
found no statistically significant increased risk, expert opinions that 
general causation was established at these lower doses were “not based on 
sufficient facts and data.”86  Similarly, the court concluded that in offering 
opinions regarding general causation, plaintiffs’ expert “did not reliably 
apply the epidemiological/Bradford Hill method because this method 
requires a statistically significant association be established through 
studies and such studies do not exist.”87  The court rejected plaintiffs’ 
efforts to substitute alleged “admissions” regarding causation found in 
company documents, such as internal emails or labeling in foreign 
countries, for actual scientific data establishing a statistically significant 
increased risk.88 
The court declined to grant the motion with respect to the 80 mg dose 
because there was epidemiological evidence indicating that patients taking 
                                                          
 83.   See In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., 227 
F. Supp. 3d 452, 462 (D.S.C. 2017), appeal docketed sub. nom. Plaintiffs Appealing CMO 109 v. 
Pfizer, Inc., No. 17-1136 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2017). 
 84.   Id. at 462–63. 
 85.   Id. at 457.  The four doses that were raised were 10 mg, 20 mg, 40 mg and 80 mg.  Id. at 
462. 
 86.   Id. at 463. 
 87.   Id.  The court also excluded the opinion of an endocrinologist who opined on general 
causation, who the court concluded “cherry-picked studies to support his conclusion rather than 
considering the totality of the literature.”  Id. 
 88.   Id. at 478–86 (“Here, expert testimony is certainly required.”). 
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Lipitor had a relative risk ratio of developing diabetes greater than 2.0.89  
However, this ruling did not have much practical effect because plaintiffs’ 
counsel in the MDL were unable to identify any actual plaintiffs who had 
taken this higher dose.  Despite repeated opportunities from the court, 
plaintiffs’ counsel did not come forward with evidence that any of the 
plaintiffs had taken the 80 mg dose.90 
The court also excluded certain specific causation opinions of experts 
proffered for the bellwether cases on the ground that “their opinions were 
based on nothing more than an increased risk and temporal association.”91  
The court noted the difficulty of establishing specific causation “where the 
alleged injury is a complicated, progressive, multi-factor disease like 
diabetes.”92  In particular, the court cited two decisions—the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP93 and the 
Florida District Court’s decision in Haller v. AstraZeneca 
Pharmaceuticals LP94—as relevant precedent.  In Guinn, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that similar opinions alleging that the pharmaceutical 
Seroquel caused diabetes were unreliable and therefore inadmissible under 
Rule 702.95  The expert in Guinn was unable to reliably rule out other 
causes of the plaintiff’s diabetes, and the court rejected the contention that 
the expert could simply assert that all risk factors, including Seroquel, 
worked together to cause diabetes.96  In Haller, the court rejected opinions 
that Seroquel caused diabetes for similar reasons.  There, too, plaintiff’s 
expert was unable to rule out other potential causes of diabetes.  The court 
observed that a mere temporal connection between taking a 
pharmaceutical and the development of disease was not a reliable basis to 
establish specific causation under Rule 702 and Daubert.97 
The court in Lipitor followed these cases and found that the opinions 
offered by plaintiffs’ specific causation experts were flawed for similar 
reasons.98  As the court observed, there were many other potential causes 
of diabetes, including the plaintiff’s BMI, adult weight gain, family 
                                                          
 89.   Id. at 457 
 90.   See id. at 457–62. 
 91.   Id. at 457. 
 92.   Id. at 464. 
 93.   Guinn v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 602 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 94.   Haller v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 95.   Guinn, 602 F.3d at 1254. 
 96.   Id. at 1255 (“An expert . . . cannot merely conclude that all risk factors for a disease are 
substantial contributing factors in its development.”). 
 97.   Haller, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1297–98. 
 98.   In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., 227 F. 
Supp. 3d 452, 464 (D.S.C. 2017), appeal docketed sub. nom. Plaintiffs Appealing CMO 109 v. Pfizer, 
Inc., No. 17-1136 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2017). 
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history, age, and hypertension.  The expert never performed any analysis 
showing why these “other risk factors for diabetes, alone or in 
combination, were not solely responsible for [plaintiff’s] diabetes.”99  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the opinions were inadmissible 
under Rule 702 and Daubert.  In granting in part defendant’s omnibus 
motions for summary judgment, the court noted that such procedures were 
effective in furthering the goals of the MDL process: “Ruling on an 
omnibus motion for summary judgment that involve [sic] issues common 
to all cases, such as whether a claim can survive summary judgment 
without expert testimony on specific causation, ‘will promote the just and 
efficient conduct’ of these actions and, thus, is the type of ‘coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings’ envisioned by Section 1407.”100 
4. The Mirena MDL 
Courts have also issued rulings under Rule 702 and Daubert to 
significantly narrow or eliminate claims in medical device litigation.  In 
the Mirena product liability litigation, for example, the court granted 
defendants’ omnibus motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
causation after issuing rulings excluding plaintiffs’ expert evidence as 
unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert.101 
The Mirena litigation involved a plastic intrauterine device that 
delivered a hormone in order to prevent pregnancy for up to five years.102  
Plaintiffs alleged that the device was defectively designed and, as a result, 
perforated, became embedded in, or migrated from plaintiffs’ uteruses.103  
The court excluded all of plaintiffs’ experts who offered opinions on 
general causation, laying the basis for granting summary judgment.104 
The court provided an extensive analysis as to each expert in 
excluding the experts’ opinions.  In barring their testimony, the court noted 
that the theory regarding the mechanism by which Mirena allegedly 
caused secondary perforations “ha[d] never been tested or studied in 
human patients, nor ha[d] it undergone animal or in vitro testing,” had not 
been “subjected to peer review and publication,” “ha[d] produced no 
‘known or potential rate of error,’” and had not “gained ‘general 
acceptance’ within the scientific community.”105  The court further 
                                                          
 99.   Id. at 465. 
 100.   Id. at 490 (citations omitted). 
 101.   In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304, 327–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 102.   Id. at 306. 
 103.   See id. at 307. 
 104.   In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 169 F. Supp. 3d 396, 427–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 105.   Id. at 429–30 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993)). 
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observed that the fact that expert testimony, like that presented in the 
Mirena litigation, was “developed solely for litigation” could “weigh 
against reliability.”106 
The court found that the plaintiffs’ expert analysis was results-oriented 
in the sense that the experts were “given a conclusion by lawyers”—i.e., 
that Mirena caused secondary perforations—“and worked backwards to 
hypothesize a mechanism by which it might occur.”107  The court 
concluded that such an approach was unreliable, reasoning: “This exercise 
does not seem to have involved any scientific methodology, but rather 
consisted of reverse-engineering a theory to fit the desired outcome.  This 
does not rise to the level of intellectual rigor employed in the medical or 
scientific field . . . .”108 
Noting that expert analysis must be “reliable at every step,” the court 
went through plaintiffs’ hypothesized mechanism, finding that there was 
a lack of scientific support at each step.109  The court observed, for 
example, that, while plaintiffs hypothesized that the hormone that was 
released from the IUD had a “foreign body effect” on the myometrium of 
the uterus (the layer of muscle in the uterus), causing it to become thinner, 
the studies that plaintiffs cited dealt with the endometrium (a thin layer of 
glandular tissue in the uterus).110  The court similarly rejected the 
plaintiffs’ attempt to extrapolate effects on one type of layer to another, 
noting: “This type of speculation, whereby the conclusions are linked to 
studies only by [the expert’s] say-so, is impermissible under Daubert.”111 
The court likewise found unreliable expert opinion regarding the next 
step of the proposed mechanism, which hypothesized that uterine cells 
grew around the IUD to “attach it to the uterine wall.”112  Again, there was 
no scientific study supporting this step of the analysis: plaintiffs’ expert 
had “disavowed the one article he cited to support this claim.”113  The court 
rejected the claim that a hormone released in the uterus weakened uterine 
tissue.114  Examining the studies that plaintiffs cited, the court found that 
                                                          
 106.   Id. at 430. 
 107.   Id. 
 108.   Id. (citation omitted). 
 109.   Id. at 431–34 (quoting Amorgianos v. Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 
(2002)). 
 110.   Id. at 431 (“[Plaintiffs’ experts] could not point to an article or study that supported the 
notion that [the hormone] had a foreign body effect on the myometrium as opposed to the 
endometrium.”). 
 111.   Id. at 431–32. 
 112.   Id. at 432. 
 113.   Id. 
 114.   Id. at 432–33. 
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they “seemingly contradict[ed]” this proposition.115  While plaintiffs’ 
experts relied on the fact that the studies found that another contraceptive 
that contained progestin (Depo-Provera) had a weakening effect on uterine 
tissue, the study authors did not attribute this weakening effect to progestin 
and in fact found that “another progestin-containing contraceptive . . . had 
no such effect.”116  The court determined therefore that the expert’s 
reasoning from this study data was unreliable: 
To conclude that Mirena would cause the same effect as Depo-Provera 
because they both contain progestin—particularly when other 
contraceptives also containing progestin had the opposite effect, the 
effect of Depo-Provera was not attributed to progestin, and the study 
found no correlation between progestin levels and that effect—is to 
impermissibly draw grossly “overreaching conclusions,” which are 
connected solely to the data by [the expert’s] say-so.117 
Finally, the court determined that the third step in the proposed mechanism 
was also unsupported because there was insufficient evidence to conclude 
that uterine contractions led to perforation by the embedded device.  The 
court observed in analyzing the study upon which plaintiffs relied that 
“there were errors in the study’s methods and findings.”118  While 
plaintiffs’ expert attempted to use his “experience” to correct for these 
deficiencies, the court concluded that “[t]his does not rise to the level of 
intellectual rigor of medical or scientific study, rendering this opinion 
unreliable.”119  Moreover, the court observed that plaintiffs’ expert had 
essentially ignored literature showing that the hormone in Mirena 
“actually decreases the strength and frequency of uterine contractions,” 
attempting to explain it away by arguing that because contractions “are not 
eliminated entirely, they still contribute to embedment.”120  The court 
concluded that such reasoning was unreliable because “[a]ny theory that 
fails to explain information that would otherwise tend to cast doubt on that 
theory is inherently suspect.”121 
As illustrated above, the court was skeptical of steps in the analyses 
presented by the experts that were not supported by data (or which were 
counter to existing data).  For example, the court noted that one of 
                                                          
 115.   Id. at 432. 
 116.   Id. at 432–33. 
 117.   Id. at 433 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Accutane Prods. Liab., No. 8:04-md-2523-T-
30TBM, 2009 WL 2496444, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009)). 
 118.   Id. at 433. 
 119.   Id. at 434. 
 120.   Id. at 433. 
 121.   Id. at 433 (quoting In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005)). 
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plaintiff’s experts relied on studies of women not using Mirena or a similar 
progestin-releasing IUD for information on uterine contractions.122  While 
plaintiffs maintained that more specific data were not available, the court 
concluded that the expert’s “lack of access to reliable data does not justify 
use of unreliable data, and militates against admission under Daubert.”123  
Moreover, as plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged, Mirena actually “reduces 
the force of uterine contractions,” but the expert “ignored this inconvenient 
truth” in relying on studies that did not involve Mirena.124  The court 
concluded that “[a] legitimate scientist or engineer in the field, knowing 
he did not have reliable numbers for a stage of his analysis, would decline 
to reach a conclusion.  [The expert’s] proceeding when he knew he did not 
have the proper basis suggests that his ‘methodology was aimed at 
achieving one result,’ which is the sort of science Daubert does not 
allow.”125 
The court also found that the experts’ heavy reliance on animal studies 
was unreliable.  As the court observed, the “reliance on animal studies, 
without a sound basis for extrapolating [those] studies to human uteruses, 
is another example where [the experts’] conclusions do not ‘flow reliably 
from the premises.’”126  The court noted that there were “just too many 
gaps between [the experts’] analysis and the conclusions” drawn from the 
evidence.127 
Finally, the court found significant the lack of support within the 
scientific community for plaintiffs’ theories regarding secondary 
perforation, noting that they had not been “generally accepted in the 
scientific community.”128  As the court observed, “[t]extbooks on 
gynecology and leading organizations such as the World Health 
Organization (‘WHO’) and ACOG do not support [the experts’] opinions 
regarding secondary perforation.”129  The court noted that “[e]ven if there 
are some members of the medical and scientific community who agree that 
secondary perforation is a plausible way by which an IUD can perforate a 
uterus, Plaintiffs have not established general acceptance.”130 
                                                          
 122.   Id. at 445. 
 123.   Id. 
 124.   Id. 
 125.   Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Faulkner v. Arista Records LLC, 46 F. Supp. 3d 365, 381 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014)); see also id. at 449 (expert’s “contention that it is ‘undisputed’ that secondary 
perforation occurs, without confronting scientific literature that refutes this notion, casts doubt upon 
the reliability of her opinions.”). 
 126.   Id. at 445 (quoting Rezulin, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 426). 
 127.   Id. 
 128.   Id. at 448–49. 
 129.   Id. at 449. 
 130.   Id.  In addition to examining their methodology, the court also closely scrutinized the 
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In a subsequent ruling on defendant’s omnibus motion for summary 
judgment on hundreds of asserted claims, the court rejected plaintiffs’ 
attempts to argue that they could bring their claims without reliable expert 
evidence establishing general causation.  In a ruling, much like that of the 
court in Lipitor, the court rejected efforts to substitute purported 
“admissions” in company documents, labeling, or other materials for 
reliable scientific evidence of causation.131  Likewise, the court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that the injuries at issue were simply soft tissue 
injuries that could be proven without expert testimony.  As the court 
observed, “[t]here is no basis on which to conclude that it is within the 
ordinary experience and understanding of lay people that an IUD could 
spontaneously travel through or become embedded in an intact uterine 
wall.”132 
The Mirena MDL is also significant because it illustrates how not only 
defendants, but also plaintiffs may seek to employ the MDL procedures to 
obtain rulings on common issues.  In Mirena, plaintiffs sought to obtain 
rulings on the reliability of defendants’ scientific theories, asserting that 
the defense experts’ contention that there was no evidence of secondary 
perforation was unreliable.133  Accordingly, the Mirena litigation 
represents an example where plaintiffs also sought to utilize the MDL 
process to obtain guidance on issues that were common to the asserted 
cases, and specifically common issues relating to the reliability of 
proffered scientific evidence.  Consistent with its rulings on plaintiffs’ 
experts, however, the court for the most part rejected plaintiffs’ 
contentions that the defendants’ scientific evidence was somehow 
unreliable or unsupported.134 
                                                          
qualifications of plaintiffs’ experts.  For example, one of plaintiffs’ proffered experts was a biomedical 
engineer who had no previous experience with IUDs or hormonal contraception like Mirena.  The 
court concluded that the expert’s engineering qualifications allowed him to testify about the 
“mechanism by which a Mirena might perforate a uterus, but he is not qualified to opine on the effects 
of [hormone contained in Mirena] on the uterus because he is not a medical doctor nor does he have 
relevant experience or expertise in hormonal contraception or the effects of hormones on uterine 
tissue.” Id. at 439 (citation omitted).  The fact that plaintiff’s expert had reviewed some articles on the 
topic did not save his opinions. Id. (“This is not the level of rigor an expert in the field would apply 
and does not pass muster under Daubert.”).  Likewise, another expert sought to opine on the adequacy 
of Mirena’s label even though she was a physiologist who acknowledged that she was not qualified to 
offer an opinion on pharmaceutical labeling in the United States. Id. at 448.  Finding that she lacked 
the requisite qualifications, the court excluded her testimony in this area. Id. 
 131.   In re Mirena IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F. Supp. 3d 304, 312, 314–320 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 132.   Id. at 312.  The court noted that, having excluded the proffered expert evidence, summary 
judgment was “compelled by the law.” Id. at 328. 
 133.   Mirena, 169 F. Supp. 3d at 419. 
 134.   See id. at 413–27.  Among other things, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that 
defendants’ experts’ testimony should be excluded under Daubert “because it arguably contradicts 
statements made by [defendant’s] employees.” Id. at 426.  The court concluded that, at most, this was 
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B. Substantive Legal Issues 
In addition to questions regarding the reliability and admissibility of 
proffered scientific evidence, which have been central to many recent 
large-scale MDL proceedings, resolution of other substantive legal issues 
can also directly resolve large-scale litigation.  Whether plaintiffs can 
bring certain substantive claims can also prove dispositive in multidistrict 
litigation. 
1. The Norplant MDL 
In the Norplant MDL, for example, the court granted summary 
judgment based on a substantive legal issue that cut across the asserted 
claims: the learned intermediary doctrine.135  The Norplant litigation 
involved claims asserting that the Norplant contraceptive failed to provide 
adequate warnings regarding side effects such as headaches, mood swings, 
depression, nausea and other miscellaneous ailments.136  Defendants 
argued that the warnings contained in the product labeling were adequate 
and that, accordingly, claims relating to the twenty-six primary side effects 
disclosed in the adverse events section of the labeling should be 
dismissed.137  Further, defendants maintained that there was no evidence 
linking any of the other alleged side effects that plaintiffs asserted to 
Norplant and thus they should be dismissed for lack of evidence 
establishing causation.138 
Defendants filed motions for partial summary judgment as to these 
categories of claims.139  Defendants first argued that the labeling with 
respect to the twenty-six disclosed side effects barred plaintiffs’ claims 
pursuant to the “learned intermediary doctrine.”140  “Under [this] doctrine, 
a drug ‘manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives 
the product when the manufacturer properly warns the prescribing 
physician of the product’s dangers.’”141 
                                                          
a matter for cross-examination. Id. at 427. 
 135.   In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 798 (E.D. Tex. 2002) 
(granting summary judgment terminating claims of “nearly all remaining non-settling Plaintiffs” based 
in part on application of the learned intermediary doctrine), aff’d sub nom. White v. Wyeth Labs., 69 
Fed. App’x 658 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 136.   Id. at 800; In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
 137.   Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 800. 
 138.   Id. 
 139.   Id. 
 140.   Id. 
 141.   Id. at 803 (quoting Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467–68 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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Applying the doctrine, the court concluded that the claims relating to 
the twenty-six conditions contained in the labeling were barred.142  The 
court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the learned intermediary doctrine 
was inapplicable because defendants engaged in aggressive direct-to-
consumer marketing and over-promotion.143  Likewise, the court rejected 
plaintiffs’ contention that there was an exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine for contraceptive drugs or for claims of 
misrepresentation and fraud.144 
Defendants likewise moved for partial summary judgment with 
respect to claims they described as “exotic” claims that did not appear in 
the Norplant labeling.145  The court granted defendants’ motion with 
respect to these conditions not disclosed in the labeling.146  Indeed, 
plaintiffs failed to submit any expert evidence supporting general 
causation with respect to these conditions.147 
2. The Meridia MDL 
In the Meridia pharmaceutical litigation, defendants similarly brought 
successful motions for summary judgment that essentially terminated the 
litigation based on the adequacy of the product’s labeling.148  The Meridia 
litigation involved claims brought by patients who had taken an anti-
obesity medication that they alleged had caused high blood pressure and a 
variety of adverse cardiovascular and cerebrovascular events.149  The 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the litigation before 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.150  After 
significant discovery and briefing on a consolidated basis, the court 
granted summary judgment as to all claims, finding that the drug’s labeling 
adequately warned of potential increases in blood pressure and associated 
consequences.151  The court’s ruling effectively ended the litigation on a 
nationwide basis, thereby achieving a global resolution. 
                                                          
 142.   Id. at 828–29. 
 143.   Id. at 811–13. 
 144.   Id. at 810–11. 
 145.   Id. at 833. 
 146.   Id. at 833–34. 
 147.   Id. at 834. 
 148.   Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 861, 868–69 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 149.   Id. at 863–64. 
 150.   Id. at 864. 
 151.   Id. at 869, aff’g In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
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The MDL court observed that the labeling for Meridia specifically 
warned that patients could experience an increase in blood pressure.152  
The court noted that “[p]hysicians are well aware of the scope of the risks 
associated with increased blood pressure and do not need specifics 
regarding the possible consequences of blood pressure increases.”153  
Accordingly, as the court reasoned, physicians would be aware that 
increases in blood pressure could lead to the sorts of cardiovascular or 
cerebrovascular events that plaintiffs claimed.154  Thus, the court 
concluded that the product warnings were adequate and granted summary 
judgment as to all asserted claims.155 
C. Preemption 
Defendants increasingly are raising preemption in a variety of contexts 
to bar claims brought by product liability plaintiffs.  Preemption has been 
employed by medical device manufacturers to argue that some or all 
aspects of asserted product liability claims should be barred based on 
conflicts with federal statutes governing medical devices.156  It has also 
been employed successfully by pharmaceutical manufacturers to cut off 
state law product liability claims on the ground that they conflict with 
federal law regulating pharmaceuticals.157   
The Fosamax MDL provides an illustration of how an MDL court 
applied the preemption doctrine to eliminate product liability claims 
brought against generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.  The Fosamax 
litigation involved allegations that an osteoporosis medication increased 
the risk of long bone fractures.158  Plaintiffs sued not only the manufacturer 
of the branded drug, but also various companies that had made generic 
                                                          
 152.   In re Meridia, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 812–13. 
 153.   Id. at 813. 
 154.   See id. 
 155.   Id. at 815.  The TMJ Implants Products Liability Litigation was another multidistrict 
proceeding whose outcome turned on common substantive issues.  See In re Temporomandibular Joint 
(TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996) (granting motion for summary 
judgment brought by defendant suppliers of film incorporated into TMJ implants on the ground that 
“suppliers of inherently safe ‘component parts are not responsible for accidents that result when the 
parts are integrated into a larger system that the component part supplier did not design or build’” 
(quoting Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 4 F.3d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 156.   See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 
860 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2017); Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015); In re 
Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010); Williams 
v. Cyberonics, Inc., 388 Fed. App’x 169 (3d. Cir. 2010). 
 157.   See e.g., In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
 158.   Id. at 154. 
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versions.159  The generic manufacturers moved under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that 
plaintiffs’ claims were preempted under federal law.160  They maintained 
that plaintiffs’ contention that the manufacturers should have included 
different or additional warnings in their labels conflicted with federal law 
that precluded them from making changes to the labeling that were at odds 
with the labeling approved for the branded pharmaceutical product.161  
They asserted therefore that plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Mensing.162 
In Mensing, the Supreme Court held that FDA regulations applicable 
to generic drug manufacturers directly conflict with and therefore preempt 
state law failure-to-warn claims.163  As the Court observed, “when a party 
cannot satisfy its state duties without the Federal Government’s special 
permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise of judgment 
by a federal agency, that party cannot independently satisfy those state 
duties for pre-emption purposes.”164 
The generic defendants in Fosamax argued that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mensing required that all state law claims arising from alleged 
defective labeling be dismissed because it was impossible to comply with 
both federal drug regulations and alleged state tort and statutory duties.165  
The court agreed, noting that “Mensing stands for the principle that a 
federal duty of sameness arising out of FDA’s regulatory requirements 
preempts any conflicting tort duty arising under state law.”166  As a result, 
the generic defendants could not alter the design of the pharmaceutical 
product or change their labels to provide different warnings because to do 
so would have violated federal law.167  Accordingly, the court granted 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed 
its decision.168 
                                                          
 159.   Id. 
 160.   Id. at 155. 
 161.   Id. 
 162.   Id. at 160–62. 
 163.   PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 609 (2011). 
 164.   Id. at 623–24. 
 165.   In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., Civ. No. 08-008 (GEB-LHG), 
2011 WL 5903623, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011), aff’d, In re Fosamax, 751 F.3d at 165. 
 166.   Id. at *6 (citing Mensing, 564 U.S. at 616–17). 
 167.   Id. *6–7, *6 n.5 (“To accept Plaintiffs’ argument that Generic Defendants could have simply 
stopped marketing alendronate sodium, this Court would have to directly contravene binding law.”). 
 168.   Fosamax, 751 F.3d at 162 (“Mensing holds that manufacturers cannot unilaterally change a 
generic drug’s labeling, and therefore a state-law claim premised on such a manufacturer being 
obligated to revise its label is preempted.”), aff’g, Civ. No. 08-008 (GEB-LHG), 2011 WL 5903623, 
at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011).  There are many other examples in which MDL courts have furthered 
resolution of the litigation through decisions on such common issues.  See, e.g., In re Accutane Prods. 
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IV. OBTAINING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN THE RESOLUTION OF COMMON 
ISSUES 
As these examples make clear, resolution of common issues is an 
important function of MDL proceedings.  Moreover, numerous courts 
have successfully narrowed or resolved thousands of cases by addressing 
such issues in various ways.  These examples illustrate that, despite the 
criticisms and the well-publicized examples in which the MDL process 
has failed, in many cases, the MDL process has worked as it was 
contemplated.  The foregoing examples demonstrate that the MDL process 
can and has worked. 
The lessons learned from MDL proceedings in which parties have 
litigated common issues illustrate a number of ways in which efficiency 
may be increased.  First, it is not uncommon for there to be some level of 
state litigation that proceeds in parallel with federal MDL litigation.  While 
defendants may attempt to remove state court cases to federal court and 
transfer them to the consolidated MDL proceedings, such efforts are not 
always completely successful.  Accordingly, where such litigation exists, 
coordination between the state and federal MDL judges may lead to 
greater efficiencies. 
Second, application of the framework developed by the Supreme 
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals is often useful in 
narrowing or eliminating claims where plaintiffs have failed to offer expert 
evidence that is both relevant and reliable.  Many of the examples cited 
above involve litigation of scientific issues under Rule 702 and Daubert, 
and the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly underscored that judicial 
scrutiny of proffered expert evidence is an important mechanism for 
eliminating claims that lack merit before trial.  However, Daubert has 
sometimes been under-utilized.  To the extent courts vigorously exercise 
their gatekeeping role under Rule 702, efficiencies are likely to be 
achieved. 
Third, MDL courts have implemented effective scheduling procedures 
that closely track litigation of the various generic and case-specific issues 
and which can increase the efficient resolution of pending cases.  For 
example, discovery and litigation of the various substantive issues may be 
phased in order to avoid unnecessary discovery and the associated expense 
and to streamline the proceedings.  Such procedures can result in 
                                                          
Liab. Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (excluding proposed expert testimony that acne 
medication was associated with inflammatory bowel disease as unreliable); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (excluding proposed expert testimony that drug could 
cause or exacerbate liver injury “silently,” without markedly elevating liver enzyme levels 
concurrently with use). 
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significant gains in efficiency and cost savings. 
Fourth, as noted above, a parallel track that gives scrutiny to 
individualized claims is important to further narrow and focus the 
litigation.  There may be cases that cannot be disposed of by resolving 
common issues but nonetheless should not proceed.  A process of 
individualized scrutiny and review therefore may be necessary in order to 
eliminate such claims. 
Finally, to the extent bellwether trials are conducted, they should only 
be conducted after procedures for narrowing and winnowing the asserted 
claims have been implemented.  Moreover, steps should be taken to ensure 
that any cases that are selected for bellwether trials are representative of 
the remaining population of claims. 
A. Coordination with State Courts 
The need to coordinate with state courts is a frequent concern in 
multidistrict litigation.  In disputes that involve multiple related cases, it is 
not uncommon for cases to be filed in both state and federal court.  While 
defendants frequently attempt to remove cases to federal court to 
consolidate them with ongoing MDL proceedings, they are not always 
successful in doing so.  In such circumstances, federal MDL courts must 
give consideration to coordinating their proceedings with parallel state 
court proceedings.  Sometimes there are similar mechanisms for 
consolidating cases within a state court system,169 but frequently cases are 
dispersed, and if cases are filed in more than one state there will be no 
mechanism available to consolidate among states. 
There are many instances of coordination between MDL courts and 
state courts.  The Manual for Complex Litigation notes, for example, that 
“[i]n scheduling Daubert proceedings in a dispersed mass tort case, an 
MDL judge should explore opportunities to coordinate scheduling with 
state courts handling parallel cases” and that “[f]ederal and state judges 
have successfully conducted joint Daubert hearings . . . .”170  Likewise, 
the Federal Judicial Center has observed that “state judges have responded 
to requests for coordination in a spirit of cooperation.”171  Even where 
there is not this sort of close coordination, state courts typically take a back 
                                                          
 169.   ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, POCKET GUIDE, supra note 39, at 24 (“States increasingly have 
adopted procedures for assigning complex multiparty litigation to a single judge or judicial panel, or 
have created courts to deal with complex business cases.”). 
 170.   MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 21, § 22.87. 
 171.   ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, POCKET GUIDE, supra note 39, at 24 (“The more transparent and 
even-handed the proposed cooperative venture is, the more acceptable it will be to other judges and to 
attorneys.”). 
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seat, allowing the federal MDL court to address these fundamental 
threshold issues. 
B. Application of Daubert Procedures 
The use of generic motion practice in situations where claims turn on 
disputed scientific evidence can be particularly valuable.  As is illustrated 
in the above examples, MDL courts have frequently applied the 
framework developed by the Supreme Court and embodied in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to determine the reliability of the scientific evidence 
supporting asserted claims.  Such determinations have often been 
dispositive in resolving all, or some portion, of claims in products liability 
cases, for example. 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that courts must serve as 
“gatekeepers” to ensure that “any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”172  In conducting such a review, 
“the trial court must scrutinize” the “principles and methods used by the 
expert,”173 and “must . . . exclude proffered scientific evidence . . . unless 
[it is] convinced [the evidence] speaks clearly and directly to an issue in 
dispute in the case, and that it will not mislead the jury.”174 
The Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test to assist courts in 
assessing the admissibility of expert testimony.  The party sponsoring the 
expert evidence has the burden to demonstrate that the requirements of 
Rule 702 are met.175  First, the expert testimony must “assist” the trier of 
fact, a condition that speaks “primarily to [the] relevance” of the proffered 
evidence.176  The Court characterized this requirement as one of “fit”—
that is, the expert testimony must be “relevant to the task at hand” in that 
it “logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party’s case.”177  
Second, the “proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate 
validation” and be grounded “in the methods and procedures of 
                                                          
 172.   Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 173.   FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 174.   Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995), remand 
from 509 U.S. 579. 
 175.   See Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[A] party proffering expert 
testimony must show by a ‘preponderance of proof’ that the expert whose testimony is being offered 
is qualified and will testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding 
and disposing of issues relevant to the case.”) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592); Daubert, 43 F.3d at 
1316 (“[T]he expert’s bald assurance of validity is not enough.  Rather, the party presenting the expert 
must show that the expert’s findings are based on sound science, and this will require some objective, 
independent validation of the expert’s methodology.”). 
 176.   Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580. 
 177.   Daubert, 43 F. 3d at 1315 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591). 
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science.”178  In other words, the testimony must offer “more than 
subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”179  Under Daubert and Rule 
702, “[i]t is the proponent of the testimony that must establish its 
admissibility by a preponderance of proof.”180 
In conducting this analysis, courts “evaluate the data offered to 
support an expert’s bottom-line opinions to determine if that data provides 
adequate support to mark the expert’s testimony as reliable.”181  “Scientific 
evidence and expert testimony must have a traceable, analytical basis in 
objective fact before it may be considered on summary judgment.”182 
Mere “hypotheses,” even if plausible and well founded, are 
insufficient to satisfy the Daubert test, for “a hypothesis is [simply] a 
scientist’s educated speculation.”183  Similarly, Rule 702 bars expert 
testimony that is inconsistent with “the vast majority of the relevant, peer 
reviewed scientific literature.”184  Under Rule 702 and Daubert, “any step 
that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the 
expert’s testimony inadmissible.”185 
As the Supreme Court’s decisions make clear, the Court views the 
Daubert framework as an important screen for assessing whether claims 
should proceed to trial.  As Justice Breyer has observed, the failure of a 
trial court to provide adequate scrutiny to proffered scientific evidence can 
have significant adverse consequences: 
[It is] particularly important to see that judges fulfill their Daubert 
gatekeeping function, so that they help assure that the powerful engine 
of tort liability, which can generate strong financial incentives to reduce, 
or to eliminate, production, points towards the right substances and does 
not destroy the wrong ones.  It is, thus, essential in this science-related 
area that the courts administer the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to 
achieve the “end[s]” that the Rules themselves set forth, not only so that 
proceedings may be “justly determined,” but also so “that the truth may 
be ascertained.”186 
                                                          
 178.   Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 179.   Id. 
 180.   Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 592 n.10). 
 181.   United States v. 33.92356 Acres of Land, 585 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Ruiz-Troche 
v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 182.   Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 653 (1998) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
144–45, 146 (1997)). 
 183.   Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 25 n.56 (D. Mass. 1995) (quoting Johnston 
v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 393–94 (D. Kan. 1984)). 
 184.   Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 185.   In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 186.   Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148–49 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
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C. Scheduling and Discovery 
Greater efficiencies may also be achieved through careful 
consideration of case management.  For example, it may be appropriate to 
establish a schedule providing for separate resolution of common issues 
early in the MDL proceedings.  As noted above, the Manual for Complex 
Litigation specifically recommends such phasing of the litigation.187  
Frequently, in MDL proceedings one of the first orders of business is the 
establishment of a case management order to govern scheduling and other 
issues.  Such case management orders regularly provide a period for the 
filing and resolution of dispositive motions early in the proceedings.188 
Such scheduling orders may increase efficiency by allowing the court 
to narrow the issues before it before proceeding with full-blown discovery 
or considering other matters.  For example, in many MDL proceedings 
there are generic issues that may be dispositive of the entire litigation, and 
resolution of such issues early in the proceedings may render further 
                                                          
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).  As Justice Breyer similarly observed in an introduction to the Federal 
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 
a decision wrongly granting compensation, although of immediate benefit to the plaintiff, 
can improperly force abandonment of the substance.  Thus, if the decision is wrong, it will 
improperly deprive the public of what can be far more important benefits—those 
surrounding a drug that cures many while subjecting a few to less serious risk, for example.  
The upshot is that we must search for law that reflects an understanding of the relevant 
underlying science . . . . 
Stephen Breyer, Introduction, in FEDERAL REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1, 4 (Fed. 
Judicial Ctr., 3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 187.   MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 21, § 22.634.  See also Rothstein et al., 
supra note 56, at 621, 629 (discussing case management order in PPA MDL litigation “split[ting] 
expert discovery into two distinct phases, with generic causation discovery to occur” first in 
anticipation of Daubert and summary judgment motions on generic issues, followed by “case-specific 
expert discovery”). 
 188.   Case Management Order No. 23, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007), ECF No. 1243 (providing for Daubert and summary judgment motions 
thirty-eight months after initial MDL transfer order in a products liability action alleging personal 
injuries caused by over-promotion of schizophrenia drug); Case Management Order No. 22, In re 
Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-40000 (N.D. Ohio MDL Dec. 6, 2007), ECF No. 186 
(providing for dispositive motions twenty-three months after initial MDL transfer order in products 
liability litigation involving alleged increased risks of blood clots, strokes, heart attacks and other side 
effects associated with use of contraceptive patch); Rep. & Rec. of Spec. Master as to Discovery Plan 
and Initial Scheduling Order, In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-MD-
1871 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), ECF No. 204, adopted and approved by Pretrial Order No. 23, In re 
Avandia, No. 07-MD-1871 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2008), ECF No. 217 (providing for Daubert and 
summary judgment motions twenty-eight and twenty-nine months, respectively, from initial MDL 
transfer order in products liability litigation involving alleged increased risk of adverse cardiovascular 
events caused by diabetes medication); Case Management Order No. 96, In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 
No. 01-MD-01431 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2003), ECF 3679 (providing for Daubert and summary 
judgment motions twenty-seven and twenty-eight months, respectively, from initial MDL transfer 
order in products liability litigation involving alleged injuries suffered as a result of taking recalled 
anti-cholesterol medication). 
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proceedings unnecessary.  Frontloading consideration of such issues has 
obvious efficiencies for the litigation. 
However, even where the common issues do not govern the outcome 
of all cases, efficiencies may still be gained by resolving generic issues up 
front.  It may be that resolution of such issues will eliminate whole 
categories of claims or that the court’s rulings may obviate the need for 
certain types of discovery, for example.  Narrowing the proceedings at the 
earliest possible stage has obvious benefits in terms of increasing overall 
efficiencies. 
Indeed, even where the court ultimately denies motions seeking to 
narrow the litigation, such proceedings may play a valuable role in 
educating the court regarding the common issues in the case at the outset.  
The court will then be familiar with issues at the heart of the proceedings—
the very common issues that form the basis for the MDL—before they are 
litigated through bellwether trials or otherwise.  Thus, even if the issues 
prove inappropriate for resolution by motion, addressing such motions 
early in the case will have benefits in terms of furthering the efficient 
resolution of the proceedings. 
Discovery may be phased in order to increase these efficiencies.  Thus, 
for example, MDL courts presiding over pharmaceutical product liability 
cases have entered orders providing that discovery will be limited to 
general causation in the initial phase of the proceedings to allow the court 
to resolve this threshold issue before proceeding to other issues in the 
case.189  Likewise, it is typical for MDL courts in such cases to phase 
expert discovery so that expert discovery regarding generic issues 
proceeds before expert discovery on case-specific issues.190 
                                                          
 189.   See, e.g., Initial Case Management Scheduling Order re General Causation at 1–2, In re 
Incretin Mimetics Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 13-MD-2452 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014), ECF 325 (“Plaintiffs 
will narrow all discovery related requests to issues involving general causation.  As a result, initial 
discovery and document production will be limited to whether the requested information has some 
tendency in logic to prove or disprove whether Defendants’ incretin mimetic drugs cause pancreatic 
cancer.”); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 21, § 11.422 (“For effective 
discovery control, initial discovery should focus on matters—witnesses, documents, information—
that appear pivotal.  As the litigation proceeds, this initial discovery may render other discovery 
unnecessary or provide leads for further necessary discovery.”). 
 190.   See, e.g., Case Management Order at 29, In re Welding Rod Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-
17000 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2003), ECF No. 63 (dividing identification of experts into “Core Experts,” 
defined as “each expert who is expected to offer testimony that is generally applicable in support of 
plaintiffs’ position,” and case specific experts, and requiring identification of Core Experts first); 
Pretrial Order No. 24, In re St. Jude Med., Inc., Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 01-MD-
1396, 2003 WL 21011310, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 11, 2003), 2003 WL 21011310, at *1 (setting different 
deadlines for disclosure of case specific and generic experts); Pretrial Order No. 73, In re Baycol, No. 
01-MD-01431 (D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2003), ECF No. 3486 (setting separate schedule for “expert 
witnesses who will be offering opinions on issues of general applicability that will be relevant to the 
cases pending in this MDL (hereinafter ‘generic experts’)”); Final Pretrial Order at 10, In re 
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D. Individualized Scrutiny of Asserted Claims 
As noted above, a parallel track that provides individualized scrutiny 
to individual claims is important to further narrow the litigation and 
eliminate claims of dubious merit.191  This type of review may be 
accomplished in many ways.  The least formal mechanism involves review 
by defense counsel to identify cases to plaintiffs’ counsel as candidates for 
voluntary dismissal.  In some cases, plaintiffs’ counsel may agree to 
dismissal in order to avoid scrutiny of their claims by the court. 
If this informal means of review fails, defendants can resort to 
individual motion practice.  There may be cases that are obvious 
candidates for motion practice.  Not only may bringing such motions result 
in streamlining the litigation by eliminating dubious cases that are the 
subject of such motions, but it can also provide guidance to the parties 
about individual cases that are not the subject of the motion.  Once a 
defendant obtains a ruling that a particular type of individual case is not 
viable, informal cooperation among the parties can be used to voluntarily 
dismiss additional cases that the parties agree would fall within the scope 
of the ruling. 
In order to employ such procedures, however, defendants and the court 
must be provided sufficient information regarding the asserted claims.  As 
noted above, it is standard practice to require plaintiffs to produce 
individual fact sheets that provide important information regarding each 
asserted claim.192  Likewise, where personal injuries are alleged it is 
standard practice to require that plaintiffs produce their medical records so 
that the claims can be evaluated.  Other basic documentary support may 
also be required, and as noted above the court may also consider 
implementing a Lone Pine order that dismisses claims where plaintiffs fail 
to comply.193 
In addition, it is not uncommon to have additional discovery of 
individual claims.  Such discovery is not only, at bottom, a defendant’s 
right, but also may be beneficial in uncovering information that will allow 
the court to further narrow the field of claims that are actually at issue in 
order to reach a negotiated resolution.  Accordingly, it is important that 
adequate information is produced in order to facilitate such procedures. 
                                                          
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 01-MD-1407 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2004) 
(“Expert discovery was divided into two main categories: generic experts (testifying regarding issues 
of general applicability, including general causation) and case specific experts (testifying on behalf of 
a specific plaintiff).”). 
 191.   See supra notes 40–52 and accompanying text. 
 192.   See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 193.   See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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The experience from past MDLs demonstrates that there are many 
claims that are candidates for voluntary dismissal without even having to 
go through individualized motion practice.  As the MDL court observed 
in the In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Products Liability 
Litigation, for example, plaintiffs’ counsel had filed numerous claims that 
they “should have known” lacked any “good faith” basis because they 
were “clearly barred by the applicable statute of limitations,” plaintiffs’ 
counsel were “unable to identify a specific causation expert,” or where 
“counsel threw in the towel and did not even bother to respond to [a] 
summary judgment motion.”194  There, the court warned plaintiffs’ 
counsel that if it were forced to decide summary judgment motions on 
cases that lack a good faith basis in the future, the court would issue show 
cause orders as to why sanctions should not be imposed.195 
Similarly, in the federal asbestos product liability MDL, the court 
established procedures to facilitate individual review by placing each case 
on an individual scheduling order setting forth fixed deadlines for 
completion of discovery and filing of dispositive motions.196  The court 
utilized magistrates to assist with the processing of the massive number of 
cases filed in that proceeding.197  The court required, among other things, 
each plaintiff to submit medical reports based on “medically accepted 
principles and practices” along with a complete exposure history to 
support their claims or face dismissal.198  In response, some plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed their claims, while defendants challenged the 
compliance of other plaintiffs.199  Cases that were not voluntarily or 
involuntarily dismissed proceeded to discovery and summary judgment.200  
The judge presiding over the litigation found that having a single court 
rule on summary judgment motions in the individual cases resulted in 
efficiency, given that the MDL court was very familiar with the nature of 
the litigation and the associated legal issues and its rulings “would provide 
                                                          
 194.   In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-MD-2004 
(CDL), 2016 WL 4705827, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2016) (Mem.). 
 195.   Id. 
 196.   Robreno, supra note 50, at 127. 
 197.   Id. at 128. 
 198.   Id. at 137–38. 
 199.   Id. at 140. 
 200.   Id. at 141. 
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predictability and consistency.”201  With the aid of such procedures, the 
court was able to resolve nearly 200,000 cases.202 
E. Bellwether Trials, To The Extent Necessary Or Appropriate, 
Following Common Issues Motion Practice 
Typically, the goal of plaintiffs in large MDL proceedings is to 
aggregate as many claims as possible and drive toward settlement.203  
Indeed, part of the reason that resolution of common issues through 
summary judgment and other proceedings is so critical in MDL litigation 
is that inherent in the litigation is an incentive to file claims of dubious 
merit.  The aggregation that drives the efficiencies of MDL litigation 
comes with an associated cost: the possibility that aggregation will serve 
as a magnet for claims that lack merit. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ counsel typically seek to try selected 
“bellwether” cases as soon as possible in order to use the results of such 
trials to pressure defendants into global settlements.  However, as 
demonstrated above, experience shows that the way to efficiently and 
equitably advance the resolution of MDL proceedings is to resolve 
common threshold issues through summary judgment on common issues.  
Bellwether trials do not necessarily say anything about the numerous 
claims that are part of an MDL proceeding that have little or no merit.  
Plaintiffs will studiously seek to avoid having such cases go to trial.  
Likewise, a steadfast defendant can always avoid any impact of a 
bellwether trial by refusing to capitulate if it believes that the case is not 
particularly representative of the cases that have been aggregated. 
Indeed, some have criticized the practice of conducting bellwether 
trials as altogether outside of the authority of the MDL court.204  The 
                                                          
 201.   Id. at 141–43 (“The key to successful execution of the summary judgment procedure was 
the MDL court’s adherence to a rigorous schedule for all cases. . . .  Setting a goal line for the MDL 
litigation, that is, the time for filing a motion for summary judgment, and thereafter deciding the 
motions promptly, provided encouragement to counsel to litigate the case diligently in the MDL or to 
settle.”). 
 202.   Id. at 180 (“[S]ince 2006, there have been 186,524 cases transferred to MDL-875 [and] [o]f 
those cases, 183,545 have been resolved . . . .”). 
 203.   See Bradt, supra note 1, at 791 (“[A]s several scholars have noted, like the class action, the 
key virtue of the MDL is that it collects most parties in a single organized proceeding in order to 
facilitate a global settlement.”); Redish & Karaba, supra note 51, at 111 (“MDL involves something 
of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather 
movies.”); id. at 128 (“Settlement is the fate of almost all cases that are part of an MDL. . . .  Parties 
to MDL cases and the transferee judges who preside over them face tremendous pressure to settle.”). 
 204.   See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 12 (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-cv-
rrrrr-suggestion_lcj_0.pdf (“The MDL statute provides for ‘coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings,’ not trials.  Despite the clear limit of this statutory authority, many MDL judges exercise 
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statute references coordination of cases for the purposes of “pretrial 
proceedings.”205  The argument of these critics is that the statute does not 
authorize the MDL court to conduct actual trials of transferred cases. 
In any event, the impact of the bellwether trial in an MDL proceeding 
is to some extent inherently limited.  As a threshold matter, the bellwether 
trial can have no binding effect on any other case.  The idea behind 
conducting such trials is that it will give the parties some measure of the 
value of the cases.206  As one group of commentators have observed, such 
proceedings may also help the parties to develop their approach to the case 
and put together “trial packages” that can be utilized in future individual 
trials.207  Moreover, the MDL court cannot compel a party to try any case 
that has been transferred to the court.  Accordingly, aside from the 
potential in terrorem effect of a significant adverse trial outcome on a 
defendant (which itself can have a fairly significant practical effect), the 
actual power of the bellwether trial mechanism to advance the resolution 
of an MDL proceeding is limited. 
To the extent that bellwether trials are part of an MDL proceeding, it 
is important to give consideration to factors that might increase their 
utility.  For example, frequently there are disputes regarding the way cases 
are selected for trial.  To the extent possible, one should seek to avoid bias 
and non-representativeness in the cases that are selected.208  Typically, 
courts employ procedures that allow both sides to select cases, frequently 
accompanied with strikes, so that the other side may eliminate cases that 
in its view are not appropriate trial candidates.209 
                                                          
the extraordinary power that inures to them by virtue of presiding over high stakes litigation to pressure 
parties to agree to a ‘bellwether’ or test trial.” (footnote omitted)). 
 205.   28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 206.   See Hon. Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 2323, 2338 (2008) (“[B]ellwether trials can precipitate and inform settlement negotiations by 
indicating future trends, that is, by providing guidance on how similar claims may fare before 
subsequent juries.”). 
 207.   Id. at 2325 (“At a minimum, the bellwether process should lead to the creation of ‘trial 
packages’ that can be utilized by local counsel upon dissolution of MDLs, a valuable by-product in its 
own right that supplies at least a partial justification for the traditional delay associated with MDL 
practice.”). 
 208.   Id. at 2326 (“[T]he transferee court must devise the appropriate methodology for selecting 
a predetermined number of individual cases from the pool for trial.”).  As one MDL judge has 
explained: “A bellwether trial is most effective when it can accurately inform future trends and 
effectuate an ultimate culmination to the litigation; therefore, it is imperative to know what types of 
cases comprise the MDL.  Otherwise, the transferee court and the attorneys risk trying an anomalous 
case, thereby wasting substantial amounts of both time and money.”  Id. at 2344. 
 209.   See id. at 2365 (“Regardless of which method is ultimately employed, a transferee court 
should consider allowing each side of coordinating attorneys to veto or strike from consideration a 
predetermined number of cases in the trial-selection pool.  No matter how diligently the attorneys or 
the transferee court fill the trial-selection pool, the possibility will always remain that, after the close 
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Another way to achieve “representativeness” is to couple the 
bellwether selection process with parallel proceedings described above 
that eliminate the cases that should not go to trial.  Through omnibus 
summary judgment proceedings, discovery of all filed cases coupled with 
individual summary judgment proceedings, and informal mechanisms in 
which counsel voluntarily agree to dismiss claims of dubious merit, the 
population of cases in the MDL can be culled so that only cases that are 
more likely to be “representative” of trial-worthy cases remain.  
Accordingly, far from being the be-all and end-all of an MDL proceeding, 
the bellwether process—to the extent it is employed at all—can be a 
beneficiary of the more critical process of resolving issues during pretrial 
proceedings to separate the wheat from the chaff among the asserted 
claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite recent criticisms, multidistrict litigation procedures have been 
employed on multiple occasions to effectively and efficiently resolve 
complex litigation.  The examples in which courts have successfully 
employed such procedures teach that it is critical to resolve common issues 
at an early stage in the litigation.  Moreover, they further show that the 
efficiency of multidistrict proceedings can be enhanced by coupling 
litigation of common issues with individualized review of individual 
claims, coordination with parallel state court proceedings, rigorous 
application of Daubert standards governing the admissibility of expert 
evidence, and phasing discovery to avoid unnecessary delay and expense 
in resolving asserted claims. 
While any set of procedures can benefit from reform, the record shows 
that courts have creatively and effectively employed existing procedures 
to resolve large and complex litigation.  Moreover, MDL courts have many 
tools that could be more widely used to curb the potential for fraud and 
abuse.  The tendency of aggregation to result in the filing of meritless 
claims can be overcome through individualized scrutiny of those claims 
through available procedures.  It is up to the parties and the judiciary to 
ensure that they are employed. 
 
                                                          
of case-specific discovery, an unrepresentative case or a grossly unfavorable case will wind up in the 
trial-selection pool.”). 
